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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become pop-
ular for medical image analysis tasks like cancer
diagnosis and lesion detection. However, a re-
cent study demonstrates that medical deep learn-
ing systems can be compromised by carefully-
engineered adversarial examples/attacks, i.e.,
small imperceptible perturbations can fool DNNs
to predict incorrectly. This raises safety concerns
about the deployment of deep learning systems
in clinical settings. In this paper, we provide a
deeper understanding of adversarial examples in
the context of medical images. We find that medi-
cal DNN models can be more vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks compared to natural ones from three
different viewpoints: 1) medical image DNNs
that have only a few classes are generally easier
to be attacked; 2) the complex biological textures
of medical images may lead to more vulnerable
regions; and most importantly, 3) state-of-the-art
deep networks designed for large-scale natural
image processing can be overparameterized for
medical imaging tasks and result in high vulnera-
bility to adversarial attacks. Surprisingly, we also
find that medical adversarial attacks can be easily
detected, i.e., simple detectors can achieve over
98% detection AUCs against state-of-the-art at-
tacks, due to their fundamental feature difference
from normal examples. We show this is because
adversarial attacks tend to attack a wide spread
area outside the pathological regions, which re-
sults in deep features that are fundamentally dif-
ferent and easily separable from normal features.
We believe these findings may be a useful basis
to approach the design of secure medical deep
learning systems.
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tralia 2Beihang University, China 3National Institute of Infor-
matics, Japan 4JD AI Research, China 5Ningbo Institute of In-
dustrial Technology, CAS, China. Correspondence to: Feng Lu
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1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are powerful models that
have been widely used to achieve near human-level perfor-
mance on a variety of natural image analysis tasks such as
image classification (He et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2017;
Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Szegedy et al., 2015), object detec-
tion (Ren et al., 2015; He et al., 2017a; Redmon et al., 2016),
and image segmentation (Badrinarayanan et al., 2017; Chen
et al., 2017; Noh et al., 2015). Driven by their current suc-
cess on natural images, DNNs have become a popular tool
for medical image processing tasks, such as cancer diag-
nosis (Cires¸an et al., 2013; Esteva et al., 2017), diabetic
retinopathy detection (Kaggle, 2015) and organ/landmark
localization (Roth et al., 2015). Despite their superior per-
formance, recent studies have found that state-of-the-art
DNNs are vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial ex-
amples (or attacks), i.e., slightly perturbed input instances
can fool DNNs into making incorrect predictions with high
confidence (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Kurakin et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al.,
2018b; Ma et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018). This has raised
safety concerns about the deployment of deep learning mod-
els in safety-critical applications such as face recognition
(Sharif et al., 2016), autonomous driving (Evtimov et al.,
2017), and medical diagnosis (Finlayson et al., 2019).
While existing works on adversarial machine learning re-
search have mostly focused on natural images, a full under-
standing of adversarial attacks in the medical image domain
is still open. Medical images can have domain-specific char-
acteristics that are quite different from natural images, for
example, unique biological textures. A recent work has
confirmed that medical deep learning systems can also be
compromised by adversarial attacks (Finlayson et al., 2019).
As shown in Figure 1, across three medical image datasets
Fundoscopy (Food et al., 2018; Kaggle, 2015), Chest X-Ray
(Wang et al., 2017) and Dermoscopy (ISIC, 2019), diagnosis
results can be arbitrarily manipulated by adversarial attacks.
Considering the vast sums of money which underpin the
healthcare economy, this inevitably creates risks whereby
potential attackers may seek to profit from manipulation
against the healthcare system. For example, an attacker
might manipulate their examination reports to commit in-
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surance fraud or a false claim of medical reimbursement
(Paschali et al., 2018). On the other hand, an attacker might
seek to cause disruption by imperceptibly manipulating an
image to cause a misdiagnosis of disease. This could have
severe impact for decisions made about a patient. As deep
learning models and medical imaging techniques become
increasingly used in the process of medical diagnostics, de-
cision support and pharmaceutical approvals (Pien et al.,
2005), secure and robust medical deep learning systems be-
come crucial (Finlayson et al., 2019; Paschali et al., 2018).
A first and important step is to develop a comprehensive
understanding of adversarial attacks in this domain.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive understanding
of medical image adversarial attacks from the perspective
of generating as well as detecting these attacks. Two re-
cent works (Finlayson et al., 2019; Paschali et al., 2018)
have investigated adversarial attacks on medical images and
mainly focused on testing the robustness of deep models
designed for medical image analysis. In particular, the work
of (Paschali et al., 2018) tested whether existing medical
deep learning models can be attacked by adversarial attacks.
They showed that classification accuracy drops from above
87% on normal medical images to almost 0% on adversarial
examples. Work in (Paschali et al., 2018) utilized adver-
sarial examples as a measure to evaluate the robustness of
medical imaging models in classification or segmentation
tasks. Their study was restricted to small perturbations and
they observed a marginal but variable performance drop
across different models. Despite these studies, the following
question has remained open “Can adversarial attacks on
medical images be crafted as easily as attacks on natural
images? If not, why?”. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge, no previous work has investigated the detection
of medical image adversarial examples. A natural question
here is to ask “To what degree are adversarial attacks on
medical images detectable?. In this paper, we provide some
answers to these questions by investigating both the crafting
(generation) and detection of adversarial attacks on medical
images.
In summary, our main contributions are:
1. We find that adversarial attacks on medical images can
succeed more easily than those on natural images. That
is, less perturbation is required to craft a successful
attack.
2. We show the higher vulnerability of medical image
DNNs appears to be due to several reasons: 1) medical
image classification generally involves a fewer number
of classes, reducing the difficulty of attack; 2) some
medical images have complex biological textures, lead-
ing to more high gradient regions that are sensitive to
small adversarial perturbations; and most importantly,
3) state-of-the-art DNNs designed for large-scale nat-
ural image processing can be overparameterized for
medical imaging tasks, resulting in a sharp loss land-
scape and high vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
3. We show that surprisingly, medical image adversarial
attacks can also be easily detected. A simple detector
trained on deep features alone can achieve over 98%
detection AUC against all tested attacks across our
three datasets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work on the detection of adversarial attacks in the
medical image domain.
4. We show that the high detectability of medical image
adversarial examples appears to be because adversarial
attacks result in perturbations to widespread regions
outside the lesion area. This results in deep feature
values for adversarial examples that are recognizably
different from those of normal examples.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we briefly introduce deep learning based medical
image analysis. In section 3, we provide an introduction to
adversarial attack and defense techniques. We conduct sys-
tematic experiments in sections 4 & 5 to investigate and un-
derstand the behaviour of medical image adversarial attacks.
Section 6 discusses several future work and summarizes our
contributions.
2. Background of Medical Image Analysis
Driven by the current success of deep learning in tradi-
tional computer vision, the field of medical imaging analysis
(MIA) has also been influenced by DNN models. One of
the first contributions of DNNs was in the area of medical
image classification. This includes several highly success-
ful applications of DNNs in medical diagnosis, such as
the severity stage of diabetic retinopathy from retinal fun-
doscopy (Kaggle, 2015), lung diseases from chest x-ray
(Wang et al., 2017) or skin cancer from dermoscopic pho-
tographs (ISIC, 2019). Another important application of
DNNs in medical image analysis is the segmentation of or-
gans or lesions. Organ segmentation aims to quantitatively
measure the organs, such as vessels(Gu & Cheng, 2015)
and kidneys (Wang et al., 2019b), as a prelude to diagnosis
or radiology therapy. It also helps locating equipment in
robotic surgery (Zhou et al., 2019). U-Net (Ronneberger
et al., 2015) is one of these specialized DNN models for
medical image segmentation. Registration is another im-
portant task in medical imaging, where the objective is to
spatially align medical images from different modalities or
capture settings. For example, (Cheng et al., 2015) exploited
the local similarity between CT and MRI images with two
types of auto-encoders.
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Figure 1. Examples of adversarial attacks crafted by the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to fool DNNs trained on medical image
datasets Fundoscopy (Food et al., 2018; Kaggle, 2015) (first row, DR=diabetic retinopathy), Chest X-Ray (Wang et al., 2017) (second
row) and Dermoscopy (ISIC, 2019) (third row). Left: normal images, Middle: adversarial perturbations, Right: adversarial images. The
left bottom tag is the predicted class, and green/red indicates correct/wrong predictions.
Deep learning based medical image analysis may operate on
a variety of input image sources, such as visible light images,
hyperspectral light images, X-rays and nuclear magnetic res-
onance images, across various anatomical areas such as the
brain, chest, skin and retina. Brain images have been ex-
tensively studied to diagnose Alzheimers disease (Liu et al.,
2014), Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Heinsfeld et al.,
2018), tumor segmentation (Menze et al., 2015), and per-
form lacunes segmentation (Maier et al., 2017). Ophthalmic
imaging is another important application, which mainly
focuses either on color fundus imaging (CFI) or Optical
coherence tomography (OCT) for eye disease diagnosis or
abnormalities segmentation. Among these applications, the
deep learning based diabetic retinopathy diagnosis system
was the first that was approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) (Food et al., 2018). (Gulshan et al.,
2016a) achieved comparable accuracy in detecting diabetic
retinopathy to seven certified ophthalmologists using an In-
ception network. There are systems that apply either a 2D
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) (Setio et al., 2016)
or 3D CNN(Dou et al., 2017) to extract deep features to
detect and classify nodules (Wang et al., 2017) in the chest
from radiography and computed tomography (CT) (Wang
et al., 2017). Digital pathology and microscopy is also a
popular task due to the heavy burden on clinicians analyzing
large numbers of histopathology images of tissue specimens.
Specifically, this task involves segmenting high density cells
and classifying the mitoses(Ciresan et al., 2013). The above
studies rely on the images captured by specialized cameras
or devices. In contrast, in the context of skin cancer, it
has been shown that standard cameras can deliver excellent
performance as input to DNN models (Esteva et al., 2017).
Inspired by this success, the International Skin Imaging Col-
laboration (ISIC, 2019) released a large dataset to support
research on melanoma early detection.
Most of these methods, especially diagnosis ones, adopt
roughly the same pipeline, on a variety of images includ-
ing ophthalmology (Kaggle, 2015), radiology (Wang et al.,
2017) and dermatology (ISIC, 2019). The images are input
into CNNs (typically the most advanced ones existing at the
time, such as ‘AlexNet’, ‘VGG’, ‘Inception’ and ‘ResNet’
(He et al., 2016)) to learn intermediate medical features
before generating the final output. Whilst these pipelines
have achieved excellent success, similar to those for stan-
dard computer vision object recognition, they have been
criticized for having a lack of transparency. Due to the
black-box nature of CNNs, humans find it difficult to verify
the system’s reasoning, which is essential for clinical appli-
cations which require high levels of trust. It is easy to see
that such trust may be further eroded by the existence of ad-
versarial examples, whereby an imperceptible modification
may result in costly and sometimes irreparable damage. We
next discuss methods for adversarial attack and detection.
3. Preliminaries
In this paper, we focus on medical image classification tasks
using DNNs. For a K-class (K ≥ 2) classification problem,
given a dataset {(xi, yi)}i=1,...,N with xi ∈ Rd as a normal
example and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} as its associated label, a DNN
classifier h with parameter θ predicts the class of an input
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example xi:
h(xi) = arg max
k=1,...,K
pk(xi,θ), (1)
pk(xi,θ) = exp(zk(xi,θ))/
K∑
k′=1
exp(zk′(xi,θ)), (2)
where zk(xi,θ) is the logits output of the network with
respect to class k, and pk(xi,θ) is the probability (softmax
on logits) of xi belonging to class k. The model parame-
ters θ are updated using back-propagation to minimize the
classification loss such as the commonly used cross entropy
loss `(h,x) = 1N
∑N
i −yi logpyi(xi,θ).
3.1. Adversarial Attacks.
Given a pretrained DNN model h and a normal sample
x with class label y, an attacking method is to maximize
the classification error of the DNN model, whilst keeping
xadv within a small -ball centered at the original sample
x (‖xadv − x‖p ≤ ), where ‖ · ‖p is the Lp-norm, with
L∞ being the most commonly used norm due to its con-
sistency with respect to human perception (Madry et al.,
2018a). Adversarial attacks can be either targeted or untar-
geted. A targeted attack is to find an adversarial example
xadv that can be predicted by the DNN to a target class
(h(xadv) = ytarget) which is different from the true class
(ytarget 6= y), while an untargeted attack is to find an adver-
sarial example xadv that can be misclassified to an arbitrary
class (h(xadv) 6= y). Adversarial attacks can be generated
either in a white-box setting using adversarial gradients ex-
tracted directly from the target model, or a black-box setting
by attacking a surrogate model or estimation of the adversar-
ial gradients. In this paper, we focus on targeted attacks in
the white-box setting under the L∞ perturbation constraint.
For white-box targeted attacks, adversarial examples can be
generated by solving the following constrained optimization
problem:
xadv = arg min
‖x′−x‖∞≤
`(h(x′), ytarget), (3)
where `(·) is the classification loss, and ytarget 6= y is the
target class. A wide range of attacking methods have been
proposed for the crafting of adversarial examples. Here, we
introduce a selection of the most representative and state-of-
the-art attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM perturbs nor-
mal examples x for one step by the amount of  along the
input gradient direction (Goodfellow et al., 2014):
xadv = x−  · sign(∇x`(h(x), ytarget)). (4)
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM is an iterative version
of FGSM. Different to FGSM, BIM iteratively perturbs the
input with smaller step size,
xt =
(
xt−1 − α · sign(∇x`(h(xt−1), ytarget)), (5)
where α is the step size, and xt is the adversarial example
at the t-th step (x0 = x). The step size is set to α = /T
for overall T steps of perturbation.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD perturbs a nor-
mal example x for a number of T steps with smaller step
size. After each step of perturbation, PGD projects the ad-
versarial example back onto the -ball of x, if it goes beyond
(Madry et al., 2018a):
xt = Π
(
xt−1 − α · sign(∇x`(h(xt−1), ytarget))
)
, (6)
where α is the step size, Π(·) is the projection function,
and xt is the adversarial example at the t-th step (x0 =
x). Different from BIM, PGD allows αT > , and uses
random start for x0 = x + Ud(−, ), where Ud(−, )
is the uniform distribution between − and , and of the
same d dimensions as x. PGD is regarded as the strongest
first-order attack.
Carlini and Wagner (CW) Attack. The CW attack is a
state-of-the-art optimization-based attack (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017b). There are two versions of the CW attack: L2
and L∞, here we focus on the L∞ version. According to
(Madry et al., 2018b), the L∞ version of targeted CW attack
can be solved by the PGD algorithm iteratively as following
xt = Π
(
xt−1 − α · sign(∇xfˆ(xt−1))
)
(7)
fˆ(xt−1) = max
(
zy(x
t−1,θ)− zytarget(xt−1,θ),−κ
)
,
(8)
where fˆ(·) is the surrogate loss for the constrained optimiza-
tion problem defined in Eq. (3), zy is the logits with respect
to class y, and κ is a parameter controls the confidence of
the attack.
There are also other types of attacking methods, such as
the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot
et al., 2016a), one pixel attack (Su et al., 2019), adversar-
ial patch (Brown et al., 2017), DeepFool attack (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016) and elastic attack (Chen et al., 2018).
In this paper, we focus on the four state-of-the-art attacks
mentioned above: FGSM, BIM, PGD and CW.
3.2. Adversarial Detection
A number of defense models have been developed, includ-
ing defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b), feature
analysis (Xu et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018), input denois-
ing (Guo et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Samangouei et al.,
2018), gradient regularization (Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Paper-
not et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018; Ross & Doshi-Velez,
2018), model compression (Liu et al., 2018; Das et al., 2018;
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Rakin et al., 2018) and adversarial training (Goodfellow
et al., 2014; Nøkland, 2015; Madry et al., 2018a). However,
these defenses can generally be evaded by the latest attacks,
either wholly or partially (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; He
et al., 2017b; Li & Vorobeychik, 2014; 2015).
Given the inherent challenges for adversarial defense, re-
cent works have instead focused on detecting adversarial
examples. These works attempt to discriminate adversarial
examples (positive class) from normal examples (negative
class), based on features extracted from different layers of a
DNN. Detection subnetworks based on activations (Metzen
et al., 2017), a cascade detector based on the PCA projec-
tion of activations (Li & Li, 2016), an augmented neural
network detector based on statistical measures (Grosse et al.,
2017), a learning framework that covers unexplored space
in vulnerable models (Rouhani et al., 2017; 2018), a lo-
gistic regression detector based on KD features (Feinman
et al., 2017) and the Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID)
of adversarial subspaces (Ma et al., 2018) are a few such
works.
Kernel Density (KD): KD assumes that normal samples
from the same class lie densely on the data manifold while
adversarial samples lie in more sparse regions off the data
submanifold. Given a point x of class k, and a set of train-
ing samples from the same class Xk, the Gaussian Kernel
Density of x can be estimated by:
KD(x) =
1
|Xk|
∑
x′∈Xk
exp
(‖z(x,θ)− z(x′,θ)‖22
σ2
)
, (9)
where σ is the bandwidth parameter controlling the smooth-
ness of the Gaussian estimation, z is the logits of input x,
and |Xk| is the number of samples in Xk.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID): LID is a measure-
ment to characterize the dimensional characteristics of ad-
versarial subspaces in the vicinity of adversarial examples.
Given an input sample x, the MLE estimator of LID makes
use of its distances to the first n nearest neighbors:
L̂ID(x) = −
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rn(x)
)−1
, (10)
where ri(x) is the Euclidean distance between x and its i-th
nearest neighbor, i.e, r1(x) is the minimum distance while
rn(x) is the maximum distance. LID is computed on each
layer of the network producing a vector of LID scores for
each sample.
3.3. Classification Tasks, Datasets and DNN Models
Here, we consider three highly successful applications of
DNNs for medical image classification: 1) classifying di-
abetic retinopathy (a type of eye disease) from retinal fun-
doscopy (Gulshan et al., 2016b); 2) classifying pneumotho-
rax (a type of lung disease) from chest-xrays (Wang et al.,
2017; Rajpurkar et al., 2017); and 3) classifying melanoma
(a type of skin cancer) from dermoscopic photographs (Es-
teva et al., 2017). Here, we briefly introduce some general
experimental settings with respect to the datasets and net-
work architectures.
Datasets. We use publicly available benchmark datasets
for all three classification tasks. For our model training and
attacking experiments, we need two subsets of data for each
dataset: 1) subset Train for pre-training the DNN model,
and 2) subset Test for evaluating the DNN models and craft-
ing adversarial attacks. In the detection experiments, we
further split the Test data into two parts: 1) AdvTrain for
training adversarial detectors, and 2) AdvTest for evaluat-
ing the adversarial detectors. The number of images we
retrieved from the public datasets can be found in Table 1.
Table 1. Number of images in each subset of the three datasets.
Dataset Train
Test
AdvTrain AdvTest
Fundoscopy 75,397 8,515 2,129
Chest X-Ray 53,219 6,706 1,677
Dermoscopy 18,438 426 107
We follow the data collection process described in (Fin-
layson et al., 2019). For the diabetic retinopathy (DR) clas-
sification task, we use the Kaggle dataset Fundoscopy (Kag-
gle, 2015), which consists of over 80,000 high-resolution
retina images taken under a variety of imaging conditions
where each image was labeled to five scales from ‘No DR’
to ‘mid/moderate/severe/proliferative DR’. In accordance
with (Gulshan et al., 2016b; Finlayson et al., 2019), we
aim to detect the referable (moderate or worse) diabetic
retinopathy from the rest.
For the pneumothorax classification task, we use the ChestX-
ray8 database, which comprises 108,948 frontal-view X-
ray images of eight different classes: ‘atelectasis’, ‘car-
diomegaly’, ‘effusion’, ‘infiltration’, ‘mass’, ‘nodule’, ‘nor-
mal’, ‘pneumonia’ and ‘pneumothorax’ (Wang et al., 2017).
We randomly sample images from the two classes ‘normal’
and ‘pneumothorax’ to obtain our data. For the melanoma
classification task, we retrieve melanoma related images of
class ‘benign’ and class ‘malignant’ from the International
Skin Imaging Collaboration database (ISIC, 2019). Figure
2 shows two examples for each class of our datasets.
DNN Models. For all the three datasets, we use the Ima-
geNet pretrained ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) as the base
network whose top layer is replaced by a new dense layer
of 128 neurons, followed by a 2 neuron dense layer for clas-
sification. The networks are trained for 200 epochs using
a stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer with initial
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Figure 2. Example images from each class of the three datasets.
Figure 3. The pipeline of training DNNs (top) and generating ad-
versarial attacks (bottom).
learning rate 0.001, momentum 0.9 and learning rate decay
10−4. All images are center-cropped to the size 224×224×3
and normalized to the range of [−1, 1]. Simple data augmen-
tations including random rotations, width/height shift and
horizontal flip are used. When the training is completed, the
networks are fixed in subsequent adversarial experiments.
4. Understanding Adversarial Attacks on
Medical Image DNNs
In this section, we investigate 4 different attacks against
DNNs trained on three medical image datasets. We first
describe the attack settings, then present the attack results
with accompanying discussions and analyses.
4.1. Attack Settings
The attacks we consider are: 1) the single step attack FGSM,
2) the iterative attack BIM, 3) the strongest first-order at-
tack PGD, and 4) the strongest optimization-based attack
CW (L∞ version). Note that all these attacks are bounded
attacks according to a pre-defined maximum perturbation
 with respect to the L∞ norm, i.e., the maximum pertur-
bation on each input pixel is no greater than . All 4 types
of attacks are applied on both the AdvTrain and AdvTest
subsets of images, following the pipeline in Figure 3. Given
an image, the input gradient extractor feeds the image into
the pre-trained DNN classifier to obtain the input gradients,
based upon which the image is perturbed to minimize the
network’s prediction to the target class. The perturbation
steps for BIM, PGD and CW are set to 40, 20 and 20 re-
spectively, while the step size are set to /40, /10 and /10
accordingly. Here, the target classes for all attacks are set to
the opposite class of the ground truth.
4.2. Attack Results
We focus on the difficulty of adversarial attack on medical
images compared to that on natural images in ImageNet.
The attack difficulty is measured by the least maximum
perturbation required for most (e.g. > 99%) attacks to
succeed. Specifically, we vary the maximum perturbation
size  from 0.2/255 to 5/255, and visualize the drop in model
accuracy on the adversarial examples in Figure 4. The
numeric results with respect to maximum perturbation  =
1.0/255 can be found in Table 2.
As expected, model accuracy drops drastically when ad-
versarial perturbation increases, similar to that on natural
images (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b).
Strong attacks including BIM, PGD and CW, only require
a small maximum perturbation  < 1.0/255 to generally
succeed. This means attacking medical images is much eas-
ier than attacking natural images like those from CIFAR-10
and ImageNet, which often require a maximum perturba-
tion of > 8.0/255 for targeted attacks to generally succeed
(Madry et al., 2018b; Xie et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019a).
We next consider further why attacking medical images is
much easier than attacking ImageNet images. At first sight
it is surprising, since medical images have the same size as
ImageNet images.
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(a) Fundoscopy (b) Chest X-Ray (c) Dermoscopy
Figure 4. The classification accuracy of the DNN classifiers on adversarial examples crafted by FGSM, BIM, PGD and CW with increasing
perturbation size . Strong attacks including BIM, PGD and CW can succeed most of the time (model accuracy below 1%) with very
small perturbation < 1.0/255. All attacks were generated in a white-box setting.
Table 2. White-box attack: the classification accuracies (%) and AUCs (%) of the three DNN classifiers on normal test images (denoted as
“No attack”) and the 4 types of adversarial examples under L∞ maximum perturbation 1.0/255.
Attack
Fundoscopy Chest X-Ray Dermoscopy
Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC
No attack 91.03 81.91 94.89 73.87 87.62 78.74
FGSM 1.15 3.71 18.68 9.76 29.98 20.58
BIM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.13
PGD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.74
CW 0.04 0.09 0.64 0.33 0.21 0.13
Figure 5. The normal images (top row), the saliency maps of the images (middle row), and their representations learned at the ‘res3a relu’
block of the networks (bottom row).
4.3. Why are Medical Image DNN Models Easy to
Attack?
In this part, we provide explanations to the above phe-
nomenon from the following three perspectives: 1) the
characteristics of medical image classification tasks; 2) the
characteristics of medical images; and 3) the characteristics
of DNN models used for medical imaging.
Medical Image Classification Task Viewpoint. Medical
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image classification generally involves only a few classes,
for example, classifying a lesion as benign or malignant.
Contrast this against the existence of hundreds or thousands
of classes of natural images in a dataset such as ImageNet.
Such a difference may significantly influence the difficulty
for attacking: the fewer classes there are, the easier for a
targeted attack to succeed. For example, attacking a ‘cat’
image into class ‘plane’ may be more difficult than attack-
ing a no diabetic retinopathy image into a having diabetic
retinopathy image. For a binary classifier, a targeted attack
is as easy as untargeted attack, since making an input im-
age “dislike” one class is equivalent to making it “like” the
opposite class. Hence, due to this phenomenon, adversarial
attacks on medical images may be generally easier than
those on natural images.
Medical Image Viewpoint. We show the saliency map for
several images from different classes, for both ImageNet and
medical images in the middle row of Figure 5. The saliency
(or attention) map of an input image highlights the regions
that cause the most change in the model output, based on the
gradients of the classification loss with respect to the input
(Simonyan et al., 2013). We can observe that some medical
images have significantly larger high attention regions. This
may indicate that the rich biological textures in medical im-
ages sometimes distract the DNN model into paying extra
attention to areas that are not necessarily related to the di-
agnosis. Small perturbations in these high attention regions
can lead to significant changes in the model output. In other
words, this characteristic of medical images increases their
vulnerability to adversarial attacks. However, this argument
only provides a partial answer to the question, as there is
no doubt that some natural images can also have complex
textures.
DNN Model Viewpoint. We next show that the higher vul-
nerability of medical DNN models is largely caused by the
use of overparameterized deep networks for simple medical
image analysis tasks. The third row in Figure 5 illustrates the
representations learned at an intermediate layer of ResNet-
50. Surprisingly, we find that the deep representations of
medical images are rather simple, compared to the com-
plex shapes learned from natural images. This indicates
that, on medical images, the DNN model is learning simple
patterns out of a large attention area. However, learning
simple patterns does not require complex deep networks.
This motivates us to investigate whether the high vulnera-
bility is caused by the use of overparameterized networks,
by exploring the loss landscape around individual input
samples. Following previous works for natural adversarial
images (Trame`r et al., 2017; 2018), we construct two adver-
sarial directions g and g⊥, where g and g⊥ are the input
gradients extracted from the DNN classifiers and a set of sep-
arately trained surrogate models respectively. We then craft
adversarial examples following xadv = x + 1g + 2g⊥.
More specifically, we gradually increase 1 and 2 from
0 to 8.0/255, and visualize the classification loss for each
combination of 1 and 2 in Figure 6. We observed that the
loss landscapes around medical images are extremely sharp,
compared to the flat landscapes around natural images. A
direct consequence of sharp loss is high vulnerability to
adversarial attacks, because small perturbations of an input
sample are likely to cause a drastic increase in loss. A sharp
loss is usually caused by the use of an over complex network
on a simple classification task (Zhang et al., 2016).
In summary, we have found that medical DNN models can
be more vulnerable to adversarial attacks compared to nat-
ural image DNN models, and we argue this may be due to
3 reasons: 1) medical image DNNs that have only a few
classes are generally easier to be attacked; 2) the complex
biological textures of medical images may lead to more
vulnerable regions; and most importantly, 3) state-of-the-art
deep networks designed for large-scale natural image pro-
cessing can be overparameterized for medical imaging tasks
and result in high vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
4.4. Discussion
In deep learning based medical image analysis, it is a com-
mon practice to use state-of-the-art DNNs that were origi-
nally designed for complex large-scale natural image pro-
cessing. However, these networks may be overparameter-
ized for many of the medical imaging tasks. We would like
to highlight to researchers in the field that, while these net-
works bring better prediction performance, they are more
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In conjunction with these
DNNs, regularizations or training strategies that can smooth
out the loss around input samples may be necessary for
robust defenses against such attacks.
5. Understanding the Detection of Medical
Image Attacks
In this section, we conduct various adversarial detection
experiments using two state-of-the-art detection methods,
i.e., KD (Feinman et al., 2017) and LID (Ma et al., 2018).
In addition, we also investigate the use of deep features
(denoted by “DFeat”) or quantized deep features (denoted
by “QFeat”) (Lu et al., 2017) for adversarial detection.
5.1. Detection Settings
The DNN models used here are the same as those used in
the above attack experiments (see Section 4). The detection
pipeline is illustrated in Figure 7. Based on the pretrained
DNN models, we apply the four attacking methods (FGSM,
BIM, PGD and CW) to generate adversarial examples for
the correctly classified images from both the AdvTrain and
AdvTest subsets. We then extract the features used for de-
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Figure 6. The landscape (bottom row) of the loss around the input examples (top row). The x, y-axis of the loss landscape plots are 1 and
2, which are the sizes of perturbations added to two adversarial directions g and g⊥ respectively: xadv = x+ 1g + 2g⊥, where g is
the adversarial direction (sign of the input gradients) and g⊥ is the adversarial direction found from the surrogate models. The z-axis of
the loss landscape is the classification loss. The use of overparameterized deep networks on medical images causes the loss landscapes
around medical images extremely sharp, compared to that of natural images.
Figure 7. The pipeline of training an adversarial detector.
tection, which include the deep features at the second-last
dense layer of the network (“DFeat”/“QFeat”), the KD (ker-
nel density estimated from the second-last layer deep fea-
tures) features, and the LID (local intrinsic dimensionality
estimated from the output at each layer of the network) fea-
tures. All the parameters for KD/LID estimation are set
as per their original papers. All detection features are ex-
tracted in mini-batches of size 100. The detection features
are then normalized to [0,1]. The detectors are trained on
the detection features of the AdvTrain subset, and tested
on the AdvTest subset. As suggested by (Feinman et al.,
2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Ma et al., 2018), we use a
logistic regression classifier as the detector for KD and LID,
the random forests classifier as the detector for the deep
features, and the SVM classifier for quantized deep features.
AUC (Area Under Curve) score is adopted as the metric for
detection performance.
5.2. Detection Results
We report the detection AUC scores of the 5 types of detec-
tors against the 4 types of attacking methods (white-box)
across the three datasets in Table 3.
Table 3. Detecting white-box attacks: the AUC score (%) of var-
ious detectors against the 4 types of attacks crafted on the three
datasets. The best results are highlighted in bold.
Dataset Detector FGSM BIM PGD CW
Fundoscopy
KD 100 100 100 100
LID 94.20 99.63 99.52 99.20
DFeat 99.97 100 100 99.99
QFeat 98.87 99.82 99.91 99.95
Chest X-Ray
KD 99.29 100 100 100
LID 78.40 96.92 95.20 96.74
DFeat 99.97 100 100 100
QFeat 87.63 96.35 92.07 99.16
Dermoscopy
KD 100 100 100 100
LID 64.83 95.37 92.72 95.90
DFeat 98.65 99.77 99.48 99.78
QFeat 86.53 89.27 95.45 93.92
State-of-the-art detectors demonstrate very robust perfor-
mance against these attacks. Especially the KD-based de-
tectors, which achieve an AUC of above 99% against all
attacks across all three datasets. However, on natural im-
ages, these state-of-the-art detectors often achieve less than
Understanding Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Based Medical Image Analysis Systems
80% detection AUC against some of the tested attacks such
as FGSM and BIM (Feinman et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018).
This indicates that medical image adversarial examples are
much easier to detect compared to natural image adversarial
examples. Quite surprisingly, we find that the deep features
(e.g. ‘DFeat’) alone can deliver very robust detection perfor-
mance against all attacks. In particular, deep feature based
detectors achieve an AUC score above 98% across all the
testing scenarios. On the other hand, the detectors trained
on quantized deep features (e.g. ‘QFeat’) also achieve good
detection performance. This indicates that the deep features
of adversarial examples (adversarial features) may be fun-
damentally different from that of normal examples (normal
features).
5.3. Why are Adversarial Attacks on Medical Images
Easy to Detect?
To better illustrate the difference between adversarial and
normal features, we visualize the 2D embeddings of the
deep features using t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008). We
observe in Figure 8 that adversarial features are almost
linearly separable (after some linear transformations) from
normal features. This is quite different from natural images,
where deep features of adversarial examples are quite similar
to that of normal examples, and deep feature based detectors
can only provide limited robustness (Metzen et al., 2017; Li
& Li, 2016; Feinman et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018).
Figure 8. Visualization of t-SNE 2D embeddings of adversarial
and normal features, extracted from the second last dense layer
of the DNN models. Each row is a dataset, each column is an
attack, and blue/orange indicates clean and adversarial examples
respectively.
Similar to Figure 5, we visualize the deep representation
of normal and adversarial examples in Figure 9. We find
that there are no visual differences between adversarial and
normal representations. In other words, adversarial per-
turbations only slightly change the deep representations.
Considering the difference in deep representations between
natural images and medical images (Figure 5), this will
lead to effects that are fundamentally different for natural
versus medical images. As the deep representations of natu-
ral images activate a large area of the representation map,
the adversarial representations that are slightly distorted by
adversarial perturbations are not significant enough to be
different from the normal representations. However, the
deep representations of medical images are very simple and
often cover a small region of the representation map. We
believe this makes small representation distortions stand out
as outliers.
To further understand why tiny changes in deep features can
make a fundamental difference, we show the attention maps
of both normal and adversarial examples in Figure 10. We
exploit the Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping
(Grad-CAM) technique (Selvaraju et al., 2017) to find the
critical regions in the input image that mostly activate the the
network output. Grad-CAM uses the gradients of a target
class, flowing into the final convolutional layer to produce a
coarse localization map highlighting the important regions
in the image for predicting the class. As demonstrated in
Figure 10, the attentions of the DNN models are heavily
disrupted by adversarial perturbations. On natural images,
the attentions are only shifted to less important regions
which are still related to the target class. For example,
in the ‘cat’ example, the attention is shifted from the ear
to the face of the cat. However, on medical images, the
attentions are shifted from the lesion to regions that are
completely irrelevant to the diagnosis of the lesion. This
explains why small perturbations in medical images can
lead to deep features that are fundamentally different and
easily separable from the normal features.
5.4. Discussion
According to our above analysis, medical image adversar-
ial examples generated using attacking methods developed
from natural images are not really “adversarial” from the
pathological sense. Careful consideration should be made
if using these adversarial examples to evaluate the perfor-
mance of medical image DNN models. Our study also sheds
some light on the future development of more effective at-
tacks on medical images. Pathological image regions might
be exploited to craft attacks that produce more misleading
adversarial features that are indistinguishable from normal
features. Such attacks might have a higher chance to fool
both the DNN models and the detectors.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of adversar-
ial attacks on deep learning based medical image analysis.
A series of experiments with 4 types of attack and detection
methods were conducted on three benchmark medical im-
age datasets. We found that adversarial attacks on medical
images are much easier to craft due to the specific char-
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Figure 9. The deep representations on normal images (first row) versus adversarial images (third row) learned by the ResNet-50 models at
the ‘res3a relu’ layer.
Figure 10. The attention maps of the network on normal images (first row) versus adversarial images (third row). The attention maps are
computed by the Grad-CAM technique (Selvaraju et al., 2017).
acteristics of medical image classification, medical image
data and DNN models. More surprisingly, we found that
medical adversarial examples are also much easier to detect
and a simple detector can achieve over 98% detection AUC
against all tested attacks across the three datasets. This is
because adversarial attacks tend to attack a widespread area
outside the pathological regions, which results in deep fea-
tures that are fundamentally different and easily separable
from normal features. We believe these findings may be a
useful basis to approach the design of secure medical deep
learning systems.
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